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ABSTRACT 
A competing risk hazard model is employed to examine the reasons for Hong Kong’s Growth Enterprise 
(GEM) companies transferring to the Main Board (MB) in the period 2000-2012. In our sample during the 
period 21 companies or 15% of the original stock moved up to the MB.  The modal life expectancy of a 
GEM company was about eight years. Companies that did not move up to the MB were at a small risk of 
delisting due to long term suspension or liquidation, but the great majority just remained where they 
were.  Regarding the factors behind transfer to the MB, of the 129 companies listed on the GEM in the 
period, we find that companies with higher net profit and greater product market power were more 
likely to graduate in the following year. However, companies with lower growth, higher financial risk and 
those audited by more prestigious partnerships were more likely to delay transfer to the MB by another 
year and hence more likely to liquidate. We also find evidence that VC backing is economically important: 
it increases the hazard of promotion six-fold. Thus, a listing on the GEM in this period was, for a 
significant minority of companies a ‘stairway to heaven’ and for much smaller proportion a ‘gateway to 
hell’.  
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1. Introduction 
A large body of literature suggests that small, young and particularly high tech firms wishing to grow 
are constrained by imperfections in debt markets (Cressy, 2011).  As a result firms with fast growth 
potential tend to raise equity via venture capital in the first instance or go directly to the secondary 
markets set up for this purpose: in the US, the Nasdaq; in the UK, the AIM; in France, the CAC; in 
Hong Kong, the GEM; and so on. Expectation is that, after having reached a sufficient level of 
operations and a sufficiently low level of risk, these firms may graduate to one of the Main markets 
to gain access to a wider range of financial instruments at premium rates. A growing body of 
literature, however, shows that a significant proportion of IPOs fail to do this and either linger on in 
the secondary markets or end their lives in bankruptcy. The reasons for failure in Western markets, 
particularly the US and Canada, are now quite well documented: being too young, small, or 
financially risky, having insufficient growth, poor advisers, and facing too much competition, may all 
lead firms down the slippery slope to market delisting and liquidation. (See the literature summary 
in Appendix 1 to the paper). The alternative and possibly more important outcome, namely 
promotion from the secondary to the primary market, has, however, scarcely been studied
i
, and the 
reasons behind such promotions are thus unknown. In theory, these two risks are in competition 
with one another: failure to transfer up (‘heaven’) may result ultimately in transfer down (‘hell’).  We 
believe therefore that it is crucially important to know the reasons behind success or failure of 
quoted secondary market firms because the large firms these promotions facilitate produce a high 
percentage of a country’s output, profits and jobs
ii
.  
The present paper helps plug this gap in the literature by explaining some of the empirical 
drivers of transfers to the Main from the secondary markets. It focuses uniquely on data from Hong 
Kong’s GEM (Growth Enterprise Market) and its Main Board, over the period 1999-2012. We study 
this market because of its geographical distinctiveness (Eastern rather than Western - the focus of all 
other studies of delistings), also because no study of delisting from this market has been done to 
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date and finally as a prelude to an analysis of the Mainland China markets of Shanghai and Shenzen. 
Bearing in mind the competing nature of the two identified risks we use, again uniquely in the 
literature, a competing hazards (CH) model, as our primary tool of analysis. This, like the well known 
Cox proportional hazards model, allows for the history of company performance and current 
characteristics to influence its current hazard rate but allows also for the fact that occurrence of one 
of the two outcomes may pre-empt the other
iii
.  
So, what are our main findings? We show that several of the factors explaining 
failure identified in the literature operate in reverse to explain the hazard of transfer from 
GEM to the Main board. Thus, higher profits, higher sales growth and lower financial risk, 
long run competitive advantage and a good macro environment all conspire to elevate firms 
to the Main board and to propel it away from bankruptcy and liquidation. VC backing 
enhances the hazard of promotion some six-fold in a given year but is mitigated by the firm 
capturing long run competitive advantage. These results we believe are both interesting and 
add significantly to the literature. The results we establish, moreover, accord with intuition 
and common sense and may serve as input to policy decisions on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we provide a literature review 
and in section 3 the hypotheses for subsequent testing. This is followed in section 4 by a 
description of the institutional context of the study. Section 5 introduces the data and 
provides some descriptive statistics. Section 6 explains the competing hazards model and is 
followed by section 7 which reports the empirical findings. A final section reviews the 
outcomes and concludes. 
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2. Literature review 
 
In an early study, Hensler et al. (1997) found that survival rates on the NASDAQ in the 
period 1975-84 were increasing in the age and size of company at IPO but also in IPO initial 
(first day) returns and in the extent of insider ownership. The role of insider ownership in 
survival may be related to the incentives to management performance provided by a larger 
stake in the company
iv
. Jain and Kini (1999), studying US SDC data, found that survival 
(defined as non-delisting) varied with calendar time and was higher for those with more 
inside ownership, better pre-IPO operating performance and more prestigious investment 
bankers. In a subsequent paper, (Jain and Kini, 2000) they also showed that VC involvement 
in the IPO process increased the survival rates of IPOs. Interestingly, VC-backed IPOs also 
carried out significantly more investment in R&D and relied on more prestigious analysts 
and investment bankers by comparison with their non-VC backed counterparts. It is, they 
argue, the VC’s ability to influence management with regard to the strategic resource 
allocation that enhances their investee companies post-IPO survival rates.   In other words, 
VC strategic technological advice is important in company survival.  
Fama and French (2001) in a study of US Nasdaq companies also found that the 
number of new listings varied over time, sharply increasing from 156 during the period 
1973-1979 to 549 during the period 1980-2001. However, in a later paper, Fama and French 
(2004) examined the impact of newly listed firms’ characteristics on their survival and 
disappearance in mergers, versus their delisting for poor performance.  The two main 
characteristics they identified as affecting delistings were profitability and company growth 
rates. In a subsequent study, Fama and French (2004) concluded that the decline in cost of 
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equity encouraged small firms to go public and it is this that explains the higher failure rates 
observed.  
Bhabra and Pettway (2003) found that, as compared with subsequent equity offerings or 
acquisitions by the firm, the quality of information provided in the IPO prospectus had a 
fundamental role in predicting the survival and failure of IPOs. However they also noted that 
the value of this information declines rapidly with time following IPO: more recent 
information is more valuable. Kooli and Meknassi (2007) investigated the impact of issuing 
characteristics and the information contained in the prospectus on the probability that an 
IPO firm survives in the long run. Using an Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model on the 
survival profile of new issues on the US SDC in the period 1985-2005, they, like Jain and 
Kini(1999), concluded that the probability of survival increased with VC involvement and 
with the degree of underpricing. Moreover, they found that a larger size of IPO was 
associated with a lower delisting risk.   
Finally, a positive impact of underwriter reputation on the probability of survival 
could be identified. Jain and Kini (2008) investigated the effect of the strategic investment 
choices at the time of the IPO on operating performance and the likelihood of failure for the 
newly public US companies. They found a positive relation between the changes in post-
issue operating performance, the extent of diversification and industry-adjusted capital 
expenditure intensity. Interestingly, they also found that companies with high commitment 
to R&D and pre-issue diversified product lines were more likely to survive.  This fact seems 
to adumbrate the impact of VCs strategic investment in R&D discussed above. Van der Goot 
et al., (2009) analysed the survival determinants of Internet companies doing  IPOs on the 
US NASDAQ during the period 1996-2001. Using a Cox proportional hazard model, they 
found that the average number of risk factors mentioned in the IPO prospectus (e.g. credit 
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risk , competition risk and industry risk),  for the internet IPOs was four times higher than 
non-internet IPOs. Moreover, the survival of Internet IPOs was smaller (2.4 years) compared 
with the non-Internet IPOs (10 years). In a related study, Bhattacharya et al. (2010) found 
accounting information could be used to predict the failure rate of Internet IPOs. Demers 
and Joos (2006) analysed the main determinants of IPO failure in US over the period 1980-
2000 and estimated an out-of-sample IPOs failure forecasting model with data on both the 
characteristics of the intermediaries and accounting information. They found that forecasts 
were negatively associated with one-year post-IPO abnormal returns.  There were also 
significant differences between non-tech and high-tech IPOs in the US with these 
differences driven by investments in intangible assets, operating performance and financial 
leverage. They concluded that IPO long-run returns anomalies may persist over significant 
periods of time.  
Cumming and Johan (2010) model VC exit decisions in terms of the marginal benefits 
and costs of exit over time. They then use hazard rate analysis to examine the factors 
determining the time to exit for 557 Canadian and 1,607 US VC-backed firms over the period 
1991-2004. They allow for three different types of exit for the VC: IPO, private (acquisitions, 
secondary sales and buybacks), and write-offs.  Investment duration is measured by the 
number of days from the first VC investment to the VC exit (date of IPO, private exit or 
write-off).  They find that expansion stage investments and large deals are exited more 
quickly than the rest and that corporate VC investments are of much shorter duration than 
private independent VCs.  Higher previous stock market returns just before exit also 
enhance the chances of immediate profitable exit as marginal returns to exiting increase 
relative to marginal costs. They also identify country factors in the duration of VC 
investments, with Canadian VCs exiting through IPO significantly faster than US VCs.  Finally, 
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and interestingly for our analysis to follow, the hazard of a writeoff is higher for smaller 
investments and lower when market conditions are good
v
.  
Johan(2010), in a paper with particular relevance to our study, examines various 
measures of IPO performance (short and long run returns, trading volume and time to IPO 
after announcement) for a sample of firms on the Toronto Stock Exchange’s junior and 
senior markets. She finds that the high tech market (TSX-V) IPOs are significantly more 
underpriced than the senior markets (TSX) and that the senior market companies have 
shorter times to IPO from the IPO announcement, suggesting better preparation for IPO 
than their high tech counterparts. Unlike the observable company characteristics (size of 
company and share offering) and presence of VC backing (limited partnerships), the senior 
market dummy (TSX) has no explanatory power. Thus she concludes that rather than the 
formal listing requirements of the different markets, it is the company characteristics that 
explain first year stock performance. Listing standards, however, help to ensure companies 
are IPO-ready and thereby signal quality to public investors. 
Cumming and Dai(2011) develop a model of VC backed firm valuation based on size of 
VC fund and limited attention of VC investors. Theory predicts that as fund size rises for a 
given number of VC personnel (limited attention) firm valuations will fall because less time 
is devoted to monitoring and harvesting individual investments. Firm valuations are 
therefore predicted to be a declining function of fund size. This is what the authors confirm 
in the data which consists of all US VC investments in the period 1991 to 2006 and 
comprising 9,266 rounds with post-money valuations. Using as measures of attention fund 
size divided by the number of partners in the fund they find that where more attention can 
be devoted to monitoring, advising and harvesting, investee company valuations are higher. 
Meanwhile, larger funds are associated with lower valuations for given attention.  They also 
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use probit regressions on the data before 2003 to examine factors determining the 
probability of successful exit, defined as exit via IPO or acquisition before 2007. In this case, 
size and limited attention, contrary to expectation, have little explanatory power. What 
seems to count is their measure of VC prestige (VC IPO share) and investee firm maturity 
measured by stage of the investment, both of which significantly increase the chances of 
successful exit. 
Espenlaub et al(2012) on a sample of 896 UK Alternative Investment Market (AIM) 
companies listed in the years 1995-2004 and followed until 2010,  found that there was an 
important role for Nominated Investment Advisors (NOMADS) in the survival of these 
companies.  They found that companies fostered by prestigious NOMADS survived on 
average 2 years longer than the rest. They also found that survival was enhanced by greater 
age and size of company at IPO, by company sales and by insider ownership.  Issues made in 
‘hot’ markets were also significantly less likely to survive. Interestingly, VC backing was 
found to have no significance in all but one of their three models, and in this model, the 
effect is to reduce the survival rate.  
Carpentier and Suret(2011) investigated the survival of a large sample (2,373) of ‘penny’ 
(small and unprofitable) IPOs in Canada over the period 1986-2003. They found that the 
failure rate for these IPOs was smaller compared with comparable companies in the US and 
attributed this finding to lax delisting rules and the market’s capacity to refinance non-
profitable firms. They also found that the characteristics of the IPOs (e.g. the disclosure of 
revenues at the IPO date, size, profitability, auditor and investment banker reputation and 
VC backing) are the main determinants of the survival of new issuers. Results showed finally 
that there was no relation between the promotion to the senior/main market and the 
financial conditions obtaining at IPO for these penny stocks.  
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In summary, there is a substantial literature on the survival of IPOs, mainly based on US 
data. The main findings are summarised in tabular form in Appendix 1. These studies 
exclusively examine single risks. Only one such study (Carpentier and Suret, 2011) examines 
simultaneously promotion from the secondary to the primary market.  To the best of our 
knowledge, no work has been done at all on the success and failure of firms on the Hong 
Kong GEM, the subject matter of the present study.  We are thus entering new territory. 
However, as the literature review shows, many of the variables influencing survival may be 
relevant to the hazard of promotion which now allows that a firm may fail as an alternative 
to being promoted to the Main Board or remaining put. 
3. Hypotheses: Competing hazards of delisting 
The literature reviewed focuses on the determinants of failure (delisting for reasons of 
bankruptcy/liquidation). Our primary interest in this paper is in factors that determine 
whether the firm gets promoted from GEM to the Main Board. However, we believe these 
are two sides of the same coin. We therefore hypothesise, in view of the findings from the 
literature and the available data (see below), the following:  
H1: Profit 
The higher the net revenues generated by the company the lower the hazard of failure and 
the higher the chances of promotion. The level of company profits is central to promotion 
from the GEM as indicated in the rules for promotion promulgated by the HK Stock 
Exchange. We have several measures of profits including net cash flow (cf), profit before tax 
(Pbt), net profit (Np) and earnings per share (Epsb).  We run regressions for only one of 
these, namely net profit. 
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H2: Financial risk 
The lower a firm’s leverage the lower its financial risk and cost of capital; hence the higher 
the chances of promotion to the MB where the cost of capital is lower, and the lower the 
chances of bankruptcy. In particular, firms raising equity finance on GEM tend to lower their 
debt ratio and hence are more likely to be promoted to the MB.  
H3: VC presence 
With respect to US biotech IPOs in the period of the internet boom, VCs (particularly 
experienced VCs) were associated either with greater caution or with delays to maximise 
capital gains in a rising market (Cressy and Remer, 2013). Thus, on this evidence, the 
presence of a VC will be associated with a retained equity share in the company (Cumming 
and Mackintosh, 2003), a greater early growth in equity value on the GEM and a lower 
chance of immediate promotion to the MB but a higher later chance of promotion.  For 
firms that are already quoted on the stock market, VC backing may therefore accelerate 
their chances of promotion by providing early strategic advice and incentive schemes to 
enhance profitability and growth. We should expect this effect to diminish at the margin 
over time as VCs have a limited horizon in which to liquidate their investments.
vi
 
vii
 
H4: Sales growth 
GEM companies exhibiting higher sales growth, for given profits, offer more potential 
(future value) to the investor on the MB and therefore are more likely to be imminently 
transferred upwards. Lower sales growth by contrast is likely to lead to the firm losing 
market share to competitors and to early chances of bankruptcy. 
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H5: Long run competitive advantage 
Long run competitive advantage reduces the cost of capital to a firm (Cressy,1995). This 
makes the firm more attractive to the Main Board in which firms are associated with higher 
credit ratings and lower cost of capital. Thus, we expect greater market power to enhance a 
firm’s chances of promotion to the MB. VCs are also often associated with investments 
possessing long run competitive advantage (via patents etc) so that if a VC combines with a 
company already possessing a more protected market the effect of the VC on promotion is 
weakened
viii
.  
H6: Counsellors 
Counsellors are firms (often law firms) that advise GEM companies after listing. Some are 
more experienced than others. We hypothesise that experienced counsellors, aware of the 
issue of premature promotion, are more likely to be conservative and delay transfers to the 
MB until the firm is considered ‘ripe’ for it. Hence the more experience a counsellor has the 
less likely he is to be associated with promotions to the MB. 
H8: Auditors 
Auditors also provide a break on promotion by ensuring that the firm’s accounts correctly 
represent its financial position.  Any queries over whether a firm matches the standards of 
the MB will decrease the hazard of promotion. More prestigious auditors (defined as the 
top 5 – see below) will break harder. Finally, problems with the accounts of firms in financial 
distress are more likely to be picked up by highly qualified or prestigious auditors. Thus we 
expect more prestigious auditors to delay promotion to the MB. 
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H9:  Market-wide factors 
Cumming and Johan(2010) found, as mentioned above, that the hazard of exit into 
bankruptcy was lower when market conditions were good. Market-wide factors in our study 
are represented by the level of the Hang Seng index, HS. We therefore expect that in any given year 
when market values are rising (higher HS), the hazard of promotion to the MB in is higher and that of 
descent into bankruptcy lower. 
ix  
4. Background: the GEM 
The Hong Kong Growth Enterprise Market (henceforth GEM), introduced in 1999, was aimed 
at satisfying the demands of high growth, technologically-oriented companies for quick 
access to equity capital despite shorter operating histories and lower profitability levels than 
that required by the Main Board. Table 1 below provides aggregate data for both markets 
covering the period 2007-2012.  
The GEM market exhibited considerable initial growth over the period 1999-2001, 
measured by listings, but then fell into decline as the number of IPOs went down and the 
number of exits from the market increased. These delistings were largely due to transfers to 
the Hong Kong Main Board, but a small percentage exited for reasons of bankruptcy. In a 
sample of 129 companies from the GEM we find that 21 or 15% delisted in the period 2000-
2012. We believe that part of the explanation of this market’s ‘decline’ lies in its efficiency in 
promoting quality companies to the Main Board (MB). As we show later, such companies 
tend to be more profitable, are less financially risky and have more protected markets for 
their products than non-promoted companies. More prestigious auditors, by contrast, are 
found to provide a brake on attempts at premature exit to the MB. Higher quality 
management and incentives to performance may also play a role in the promotion process, 
as attested by the fact VC presence enhances the hazard of exiting to the MB some five-fold. 
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We can see from Table 1 that numbers on the MB display moderate growth over the six 
years covered, facilitated in part by transfers upwards from the GEM. These transfers in the 
period 2008-2011, for example, were both significant and more than counterbalanced the 
effects of MB delistings on the stock of MB companies. 
Table 1: Main Board and GEM Summary Statistics 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
No. of listed companies       
Main Board 1048 1087 1145 1244 1326 1368 
GEM 193 174 174 169 170 179 
No. of delistings       
Main Board 9 8 10 7 6 10 
GEM 7 21 5 12 12 3 
Transfer of listing from GEM 4 18 4 12 12 2 
Total market capitalisation        
Main Board (HK$bn) 159,300 79,819 138,053 162,330 135,895 170,628 
GEM (HK$mil) 1,249,517 351,597 816,061 1,043,910 658,676 611,628 
Total annual turnover value       
Main Board (HK$bn) 166,825 137,014 119,951 132,363 133,084 103,504 
GEM (HK$mil) 1,940,421 1,257,612 2,301,590 3,464,258 2,223,149 1,207,708 
Average dividend yield (%)       
Main Board 2.21 5.38 2.33 2.31 3.31 2.81 
GEM 0.68 2.76 0.77 0.95 0.52 0.88 
Average P/E ratio       
Main Board 22.47 7.26 18.13 16.67 9.68 10.50 
GEM 44.91 8.01 38.98 31.10 22.16 18.38 
Average book value ratio       
Main Board 2.81 1.17 1.91 1.99 1.41 1.50 
GEM 3.47 0.81 1.99 2.52 1.39 1.57 
S&P/HKEx Index        
Main Board 33708 17891 25564 27392 22252 27082 
GEM 1349.64 385.47 677.01 810.52 474.80 381.51 
Source: Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) Fact Books. 
 
5 The data  
Our analysis sample is taken from the GTA’s Hong Kong Listed Company Research Database 
with additional information on VC backing provided by Thomson One Banker and covers the 
period 1999 to 2012.  The dataset consists of 769 firm-years (observations) on 129 
companies
x
 and constitutes an unbalanced panel of companies listed on the GEM with 
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generally different starting (IPO) and ending (delisting) dates. All went to IPO in the period 
1999-2012. Some exited to the Main Board over time and some delisted for reasons of 
bankruptcy. For many companies listed on the GEM the outcome is not known at the end of 
the sample period as the companies are continuing operations and remain listed. These are 
so-called censored observations.  
5.1 Delistings and their reasons 
Over the period 28 delistings from the GEM occurred
xi
. Up to 9 different reasons for 
delisting encountered in this period are identified in the database, although in our sample, 
several of these categories are empty. Delisting reasons are identified  in Table 2 below. The 
remaining 112 companies were still listed on GEM at the cutoff point of the study, 2012. We 
note in Table 2 below that the modal frequency of upwards delistings is for reasons 7 and 8: 
Introductions and Transfers to the MB.  There were no delistings due to voluntary 
cancellations (reason 1), and only four due to long term suspensions or to pre-emption 
(reasons  3 and 4). No GEM companies were merged or taken over in the period (reason 6) 
and reason 2 (omitted) refers to privatisations of public companies, so cannot be considered 
as delistings in the way that the other reasons are.  
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Table 2: Reasons for company delisting and their frequencies 
Reasons Frequency 
0: Company did not delist in period 104 
1:  voluntary cancellation of listing 0 
2:  privatisation [3] 
3: Cancellation due to long term suspension 3 
4: Cancellation of listing due to pre-emption 1 
5: Cancellation of listing due to Voluntary Liquidation 0 
6: Cancellation of listing due to merger, acquisition and asset restructuring 0 
7:  Voluntary cancellation of listing on GEM and listing on the Main Board by 
Introduction 
1 
8. Transfer of Listing from GEM to Main Board(MB) 20 
9. Other [Applicable to companies listed on the MB only] 0 
Total 129[132] 
Table reports delisting frequencies by delisting type from the GTA database sample. See later for a 
discussion of data sources. 104 companies in our sample remained on the GEM at the end of the period of 
study, 2012. 
 
In the competing hazards model below we shall model the risk of transfer/intro to the MB 
(described henceforth as transfer or promotion) as the primary delisting outcome and 
failure (reasons 3 and 4) as the ‘competing’ risk.  These exits are contrasted with censored 
outcomes where the failure has not yet occurred (and may never occur), namely, reason 0. 
The remaining variables used in the analysis are defined in Table 3 below. 
5.2  Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics are presented  in Table 4.  We display median as well as mean values 
because the distributions are quite positively skewed with median values usually well below the 
means.  Panel s  A and B offer descriptives for  time-varying  and for time-invariant covariates 
respectively.  
Financials 
The mean and median firm size over the period, measured by operating sales (oprev), was HKD30 
and HKD7.6 respectively. The typical firm in our sample had mean and median net profits
xii
 in an 
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Table 3: Defnitions of variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
average year of HKD462,000 and HKD25,800 respectively, though there is much dispersion around 
these figures with some firms making losses of HKD80m and others profits of HKD143m. 
Whilst median net profits declined at 18% per annum (gNp), at the top end of the 
distribution some firms’ profits grew vertiginously at over 150% pa. The median leverage of 
the sample (debtrat) is .49 which indicates that about half of the typical firm’s assets were 
financed by debt
xiii
.  
Competition 
As regards product market competition the median Herfindahl index of .13 tells us that the 
typical firm faced the equivalent of 7 or 8 equal-sized (listed) competitors in any year in the 
period. We do not have data on non-listed competitors, so this represents a minimum 
degree of competition. 
Variable Definition 
IPOyr(i) Year of the company’s IPO on GEM 
Delistwhy(i) Reason for delisting of stock from GEM (see Table 3 for details) 
Heaven(i) =1 if the firm was promoted at some time in the period;=0 else  
Debtrat(i,t) Debt/total assets 
Oprev(i,t) Operating revenue HKD millions 
Goprev(i,t) Annual growth of operating revenue 
Aud5(i) =1 if company’s auditors are in the top 5 
Expc10(i) =1 if counselling firm advised at least 10 GEM companies 
Np(i,t) Net profit ( i.e. profit after tax) in HKD millions 
Herf(i,j,t) Herfindahl index of industrial concentration for firm i in industry j 
at time t 
VCXherf(i,t) VC*herf 
HS(t) Hang Seng index at time t 
Note: table provides definitions of company-specific variables constant over time (with i  
subscript only), company specific variables that vary over time (subscript i,t) and those 
(Herfindahl only) that vary with firm, industry and time (ijt).  
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Market index 
The Hang Seng index is used to represent the level of the stock market as a whole. In this 
period it attained a mean value of 15,628 whilst demonstrating a rising trend from 10,321 to 
23,700.  
Table 4: Whole sample summary statistics for regressors 
Panel A: Time-varying covariates 
variable N Mean  Median  min max 
Np 769 .4620 .0258 -80.43 143.0 
Oprev 769 30.47 7.648 .0101 1260.6 
Goprev 634 1.203 .1626 -.9985 197.7 
Debtrat 766 2.537 .4925 .0036 336.4 
TL 766 23.25 7.831 .0422 758.9 
TA 769 42.22 14.34 .1254 1154.8 
Herf 769 .2482 .1315 .0600 1 
HS 769 15628 14402 10321 23700 
Descriptive statistics for the whole sample over the period 2000-2012 for variables with 
Within variation. Mean and median figures are overall means and medians for each variable 
across both firms and years. N is the number of firm-years. Value figures are in $US millions. 
For definitions of variables see Table 3. Note that leverage values (debtrat) above 1 indicate 
negative book value of equity.  Only firms with two years of data or more are included in 
anticipation of the hazard rate analysis to follow. 
 
Panel B:  Time-invariant covariates 
Market index 
The Hang Seng index is used to represent the level of the stock market as a whole. In this 
period it attained a mean value of 15,629 growing some 130% from 10,321 to 23,700.  
Variable         N Mean Median  Std. Dev. Min Max 
expc10 135 .3926 0 .4901 0 1 
Aud5 135 .1852 0 .3899 0 1 
VC 134 .1045 0 .3070 0 1 
       
IT 135 .2963 0 .4583 0 1 
Consgds 135 .2222 0 .4173 0 1 
Services 135 .1555 0 .3638 0 1 
Descriptive statistics for the sample over the period 2000-2012 for variables with no Within variation. 
Number of observations, N, is the number of firms. Note that N=134 or 135 which exceeds the number used 
in the survival analysis as there is missing data on individual regressors and firms for which there is only one 
year of data are of necessity excluded from the hazard rate analysis. For definitions of variables see Table 3. 
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Sectors  
We present data for the three most frequent industrial sectors, namely, IT (30%), Consumer 
Goods (consgds)(22%) and Services (16%). These jointly account for two thirds of the 
companies in our sample.  
Industrial concentration 
Industrial concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index for industry j in year t, , is 
the sum of the squared shares in operating revenue in that industry: 
 = ∑ 
	

   
where  
 = share of firm i in operating revenue of listed firms in industry j at year t 
This index varies between 0 (perfect competition) and 1 (monopoly) with higher values 
associated with more market power and less competition. In the present data we can see 
that at 25%, the typical  firm in a given year operates in a moderately competitive 
environment, equivalent to a market with four equal sized firms
xiv
.  However, the index 
varies over all firm-years between 6% (17 equal-sized firms) and 1 (one firm or monopoly).  
Auditors 
About 1 in 5 companies had auditors in ‘the international top 5’, a set of presigious auditors 
(defined here as PWC, KPMG, Deloittes,Ernst and Young and Grant Thornton).  
Counsellors 
Each company on GEM must have a Counsellor or advisor to its operations.  A set of 
counsellors was selected with above average experience in either the GEM or the MB. Using 
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the criterion of whether it had advised more than 10 companies in the period, we ended up 
with 10 counsellor-specific dummies for analysis.  We then defined a dummy, expc10, equal 
to one if firm i is in the ‘experience set’ and zero  elsewhere.   
VC backing 
Our proxy for the role of the VC is simply a dummy variable
xv
. One in ten companies listed 
on GEM in the period had VC backing at some stage.  
5.3  Multicollinearity: Condition number 
We address the question of co-linearity of the regressors in the regressions that follow by 
calculating the condition number (CN) of the data matrix of the regressors (Belsley, Kuh and 
Welch, 1980). ‘Degenerating’ co-linearity amongst the regressors (resulting in an unstable 
data matrix) is associated with a CN greater than 30.  The CN for our regressors, including 
quadratic terms and depending on the covariate set chosen, varies between 2.5 and 17.35. 
So collinearity is not a problem for our analysis. 
6 Hazard rate modelling 
The hazard rate in the standard Cox Proportional Hazards model is defined as the probability 
that a firm will transfer to the main market next year given that it has not done so up to the 
current year. Any other outcome is treated as ‘censored’ (i.e. we do not know the outcome 
in the period of the study). Formally, if  is the time at which company transfers then the 
hazard of transfer, h(t), is written 
ℎ =  ≤  <  + ∆| ≥  = ∆/[1 − ]    (1) 
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where ∆ is the probability that the event will occur in a ‘small’ time interval ∆  and 
F(t) is the corresponding cumulative distribution function. Implicitly, the conditioning also 
includes a set of covariates that may influence the position of the hazard function. The Cox 
hazard function for firm j, takes the specific form: 
ℎ = ℎ exp	%&         (2) 
where ℎ  is an unspecified baseline hazard function of time, and %  is a vector of 
covariates for firm j  that may be time-varying
xvi
. & is a vector of fixed coefficients. Whilst 
ℎ  is initially unknown it is possible to estimate it ex post, as we shall see.  
To enable the modelling of competing risks the Cox model is modified as follows.  Define  
ℎ = lim
∆→ 
Pr	 ≤  <  + ∆, .%/	0	.102	/	| ≥ )
∆
 
           (3) 
as the hazard of exit for reason i, with T is the time to first exit from any cause. Regardless of 
whether the reasons in question are independent, the total risk of any event occurring, the 
overall hazard rate, is  
 ℎ) = ∑ ℎ)          (4) 
Once exit has occurred however, the exit is for reason i with probability 
 ℎ)/ℎ)          (5)  
In the present analysis we have two causes of exit: transfer to the main market and 
bankruptcy.  
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7 Empirical Results 
7.1 MB Transfer function  
Table 5 and Chart 1 show the upwards delisting process with the time origin set at each 
company’s IPO year (IPOyr) so that analysis time=current year-IPO year. We start with 129 
Table 5: Transfer function using as origin IPO year 
Time 
(years) 
Beg.  
Total 
No.  
Transf. 
Net  
Lost 
Transfer 
Function 
Std  
Error. 
1 129 1 1 0.0078 0.0077 
2 127 1 4 0.0156 0.0109 
3 122 1 3 0.0236 0.0135 
4 118 0 4 0.0236 0.0135 
5 114 1 11 0.0322 0.0159 
6 102 0 19 0.0322 0.0159 
7 83 4 27 0.0788 0.0273 
8 52 6 20 0.1851 0.0474 
9 26 1 16 0.2165 0.0550 
10 9 4 2 0.5647 0.1333 
11 3 2 1 0.8549 0.1265 
Table shows the Kaplan-Meir ‘failure’ function with ‘failure’ here defined as transfer to the 
Main Board.  It ignores downward exits due to bankruptcy. Including these would result in a 
final transfer probability of one. ‘Net lost’ refers to attrition due to censoring. Time is 
measured in years since IPO year.
xvii
  
 
firms ‘at risk’ of promotion. Then firms progressively exit to the MB or their data are 
censored (it reaches the end of the calendar time period, 2012).  The MB transfer function 
represents the probability of a firm transferring to the MB after year t  given its not having 
transferred up to year t
xviii
.  We can see clearly from Chart 1 that there is little change in this 
function over the first six years.  However, it jumps significantly upwards between years six 
and seven and again between years nine and ten of trading.  By year eleven the chances of 
transfer rise to 85%. The ‘staircase to heaven’ thus ensures, almost with certainty, that if it it 
is going to exit, by year 11 of a firm’s life it will have reached ‘heaven’ (Main Board), or with 
only 15% probability that it will exit to ‘hell’ (Bankruptcy). 
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Chart 1: Kaplan-Meir MB Transfer function for GEM 
 
7.2 Lifespan 
Defining the lifespan of a listed company as the difference between the year of delisting and 
the year of IPO we can plot the distribution of lifetimes. Chart 2 shows that lifespans of 
companies on the GEM, defined as the time between IPO and transfer to MB, are somewhat 
dispersed. Whilst the mode is around 8 years, some transfer as quickly as 1 year and some 
take up to 11 years to achieve promotion.  
Our next question then, is to uncover the factors affecting lifespan on the GEM, bearing in 
mind that in reality, and mirrored in our modeling process, promotion is juxtaposed to 
failure as a reason for delisting. To answer this question we avail ourselves of a competing 
hazards model which allows that a firm may exit in any period for one of these two reasons, 
and of course once exited, exit for the other reason is precluded. 
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Chart 2: Lifespan of GEM-listed companies, 2000-2012 
 
 
a. Bivariate comparisons 
Table 6 examines the descriptive statistics of the data by comparing firms that go to heaven 
(delistwhy=7, 8) versus the rest.  We note that firms moving to the MB are much more 
profitable (Np), have slower
xix
 but less variable sales growth (goprev
xx
), have much lower 
leverage (debtrat), are more likely to be VC-backed (VC), are more likely to be audited by a 
firm in the top 5
xxi
. They also had more product market power (herf) and better market 
conditions in which to operate (HS).  
 
 
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
D
en
sit
y
0 5 10
Years trading since IPO
24 | P a g e  
 
Table 6:  Heavenbound: GEM transfers to the Main Board, 2000-2012 
 
Heaven=0 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Np 748 .1257*** 11.89 -80.43 143.0 
Goprev 613 1.220 11.23 -.9985 197.7 
Debtrat 745 2.608*** 16.47 .003590 336.5 
VC 745 .09396** .2920 0 1 
Herf 748 .2436*** .2220 .06004 1 
expc10 748 .4613 .5943 0 1 
Aud5 748 .1858 .3892 0 1 
HS 748 15456*** 4594 10321 23700 
Heaven=1 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Np 21 12.44*** 18.79 -2.911 80.16 
Goprev 21 .7306 .7321 -.4248 2.569 
Debtrat 21 .3436*** .1665 .03444 .6253 
VC 21 .2381** .4364 0 1 
Herf 21 .4110*** .1911 .2466 1 
expc10 21 0 0 0 0 
Aud5 21 .0476 .2182 0 1 
HS 21 21747*** 2153 17118 23700 
Table reports descriptive statistics for firms going to heaven (MB) i.e. delistwhy=7 or 8 versus 
those not, allowing for differences in variances between the populations. ***,** and * 
indicate differences between the two groups significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
The continuous variable differences are tested using Welch’s method which does not assume 
equal variances. The binary variables’ significance test employed is a standard one of 
difference in proportions. We note that there are no advisers in the set transferring with 10 
firms’ experience behind them. This variable is henceforth dropped from the analysis. 
 
7.3 Hazard rate regressions  
Table 6 below presents the regression results.  We provide estimates in fact of six different 
models, namely the Cox Proportional Hazards (CPH or model 1), Competing Hazards (CH or 
model 2),  Weibull hazard (WH or model 3), Gompertz hazard (GH or model 4), Logistic 
(model 5) and Rare Events Logit(RE or model 6)
xxii
. In the CH model we specify the 
dependent variable as follows: 
Delistwhy=7 or 8 defines the exit event to the MB (‘heaven’) 
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Delistwhy=1, 3, 4 or 5 defines the competing risk of bankruptcy/liquidation (‘hell’)
xxiii
 
Delistwhy=0 is a censored observation i.e. one for which the outcome not known at 
the end of study period (‘limbo’) 
Thus, for the Competing Hazards model, either the firm moves up (positive delisting), moves 
down (negative delisting) or remains listed on GEM (jury is out).  Bankruptcy is the 
competing hazard for promotion and continuation on the GEM is a censored observation. 
For the remaining models our binary outcome in any year is either transfer (heaven=1 or 
equivalently delistwhy =7 or 8) or non-transfer (heaven=0 or equivalently delistwhy=0,1,3,4 
or 5) so that failure is treated as a non-transfer from GEM in that year.  
In examining Table 7, note firstly that the models fitted are all highly significant 
(Wald Chi2 or F-stat p-value=0.0000) so that they identify significant influences on the 
promotion hazard
xxiv
. The coefficients also generally have the predicted signs and are 
consistent across models, exceptions being in the second order terms (quadratics and 
interactions) where significance levels vary. The results for the CPH and CH models (models 
1 and 2) produce hazard/cumulative incidence functions most consistent with the Kaplan-
Meir functions shown earlier.  Thus  greater net profits, higher growth, less financial risk, 
less competition and lower tier (less permissive) auditors all predict a higher chance of 
graduating next year, as does a higher stock market index
xxv
. Note that the effects of VC 
presence are significant in three out of the four models. However, the effects on promotion 
rely to some degree on the interaction of VC presence and market power. The direct effect 
of a VC is to increase the chances of promotion in the next year. However, the marginal 
impact of the VC on the hazard of promotion depends on the level of concentration (herf). 
For low values of herf, the marginal impact of the VC is positive. However, a more protected 
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market (higher Herfindahl index) reduces the effectiveness of the VC - presumably the firm 
is in less need of a VC if e.g. it has plenty of valuable patents protecting its product markets. 
We note that the coefficients for the CPH and CH models differ very little which suggests 
that those companies moving to the MB versus those descending into bankruptcy are not 
significantly competing risks
xxvi
.  In other words, firms that are likely to delist for reasons of 
bankruptcy are, at the margin, driven by the same factors as firms that are likely to graduate 
to the Main Board.  This conclusion is moreover, consistent with earlier American studies. 
Finally, for robustness we estimated a Rare Events logit (relogit) model to allow for the 
possibility that the population proportions for the dependent variable may differ from those 
in the sample
xxvii
. As can be seen, the significance and signs of the key variables remain as in 
the logistic model.  
Thus our theoretical predictions may be considered vindicated by the data and the 
CH and CPH models seems to support the data best, as measured by the shape of the CP 
hazard function in Chart 3.  The economic significance of the various variables varies 
substantially
xxviii
. 
xxix
The market index plays a central role with a 10% increase in the Hang 
Seng multiplying a firm’s hazard of promotion 47-fold at the mean and 35-fold at the 
median: clearly, the market timing of applications for promotion (as with IPOs) is central to 
their chances of immediate success.  At firm level, however, VC backing was critical, 
multiplying the promotion hazard five-fold in any one year.  By contrast a shift of auditor to 
one in the top 5 reduced the chances of immediate promotion by three quarters: auditors 
place quite a powerful brake on premature ascent to the pearly gates. Less spectacularly, 
but still very important, a 10% increase in sales growth or financial risk led to a one third 
increase or decrease respectively in a firm’s promotion chances in the next year. Product 
27 | P a g e  
 
market power, interestingly, also had significant economic effects, with a 10% increase in 
the Herfindahl index for a firm leading to a 25% increase in its promotion hazard. Finally, 
and surprisingly, net profits of the company, whilst having a statistically significant and 
positive on promotion, only increased the hazard of an upward movement by about half a 
percent. This likely reflects, in a time of stock market boom, the sacrifice of profits to sales 
growth as an arbiter of future performance. 
The CPH smoothed proportional hazards function is presented in Chart 3 below. We 
note that it is increasing in the time trading on the GEM, at first at an increasing, then after 
about year six, at a decreasing rate.  The hazard in any one year never exceeds 20%. 
Chart 3: The smoothed Cox Proportional Hazard function  
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Table 7:  Cox hazard, competing hazard and other models of promotion  
 
 
 
 
Model 1: 
Cox  Single  
hazard (CPH) 
Model 2: 
Competing 
Hazards (CH) 
Model 3: 
Weibull 
Hazard (WH) 
Model 4: 
Gompertz 
 hazard (GH) 
Model 5: 
Logistic 
 
Model 6: 
RElogit 
 
Np .1249 
(0.000) 
.1249 
(0.000) 
.1133 
(0.000) 
.1095 
(0.000) 
.2091 
(0.000) 
.1590 
(0.003) 
Np2 -.001382 
(0.001) 
-.001382 
(0.001) 
-.001279 
(0.005) 
-.001216 
(0.005) 
-.002349 
(0.003) 
-.001704 
(0.047) 
Goprev 2.515 
(0.061) 
2.515 
(0.061) 
1.972 
(0.001) 
2.232 
(0.015) 
3.468 
(0.003) 
2.885 
(0.008) 
goprev2 -.6059 
(0.110) 
-.6059 
(0.110) 
-.5042 
(0.025) 
-.5613 
(0.080) 
-.9719 
(0.017) 
-.7453 
(0.059) 
Debtrat -1.491 
(0.055) 
-1.491 
(0.055) 
-2.356 
(0.003) 
-1.994 
(0.010) 
-2.782 
(0.014) 
-2.231 
(0.045) 
VC 1.823 
(0.095) 
1.823 
(0.095) 
1.9367 
(0.075) 
1.601 
(0.127) 
3.508 
(0.089) 
1.846 
(0.034) 
VCXherf -5.351 
(0.261) 
-5.351 
(0.261) 
-2.856 
(0.070) 
-3.709 
(0.108) 
-3.701 
(0.512) 
.. 
Herf 9.207 
(0.004) 
9.207 
(0.004) 
10.03 
(0.000) 
9.3934 
(0.000) 
13.92 
(0.033) 
13.61 
(0.038) 
herf2 -7.206 
(0.100) 
-7.206 
(0.100) 
-5.799 
(0.013) 
-6.163 
(0.016) 
-8.720 
(0.408) 
-10.93 
(0.202) 
Aud5 -1.472 
(0.022) 
-1.472 
(0.022) 
-1.842 
(0.032) 
-1.860 
(0.013) 
-1.738 
(0.012) 
-.6821 
(0.367) 
HS .002463 
(0.001) 
.002463 
(0.001) 
.0001165 
(0.005) 
.0000485 
(0.381) 
.004485 
(0.019) 
.003190 
(0.067) 
HS2 -5.85e-08 
(0.003) 
-5.85e-08 
(0.003) 
-11.65 
(0.002) 
.. -1.04e-07 
(0.027) 
-7.43e-08 
(0.082) 
Const .. ..   -11.65 
(0.002) 
-10.32 
(0.000) 
-54.65 
(0.006) 
-34.47 
(0.056) 
Chi2(df) 181.1(12) 
(0.0000) 
181.4(12) 
(0.0000) 
110.7(11) 
(0.0000) 
129.8(11) 
(0.0000) 
59.29 
(0.0000) 
.. 
Ln(p) .. .. .8695 
(0.260) 
.. .. .. 
gamma .. .. .. .5481 
(0.054) 
.. .. 
Pseudo R2 .. .. .. .. .5918 .. 
N obs 605 605 605 605 630 632 
N firms 125 125 125 125 125 125 
N proms 21 21 21 21 21 21 
N compete .. 3 .. .. .. .. 
Table reports estimates of the Cox PH, Competing risks, Weibull and Gompertz hazard models along with  
The Logistic and Rare events logistic (RElogit) models. Chi2 and Pseudo-R2 are not reported by STATA for the 
RElogit. P-values are in brackets and are based on robust standard errors. The Relogit corrects for selection 
on the dependent variable using the method of priors.  A robustness check performed on the CPH model 
tests of the Proportional Hazards assumption using Schoenfeld residuals. This test failed to reject the Null of 
proportionality of hazards (p=.85). 
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8 Summary and conclusions 
In this paper we used a competing risk and a range of other survival models to examine the 
reasons for Hong Kong’s Growth Enterprise (GEM) companies transferring to the Main 
Board (MB) in the period 2000-2012. Over this period 21 companies or 15% of the 2002 
stock had moved up to the MB.  The modal life expectancy of a GEM company (time from 
entry to exit for those that did exit) was about eight years. Companies that did not move up 
to the MB were at a small risk of delisting due to long term suspension or liquidation, but 
the vast majority we found just remained where they were.  We were able to identify the 
factors behind those that did transfer to the MB: the market index(+), VC backing(+), choice 
of auditor(-), company financial risk(-), sales growth (+), product market power(+) and net 
profit(+). From a quantitative perspective, market effects dominated: a 10% increase in the 
Hang Seng led to a 35-fold increase in the annual hazard of promotion. At the firm level, 
however, we were able to quantify other important factors in promotion: VC backing was 
found (at the mean) to increase the firm’s hazard six-fold in any year, whilst a 10% increase 
in sales growth this year raised the chances of ‘graduation’ by one third in the next. By 
contrast, the choice of a Top 5 auditor reduced the chances of promotion in the next year by 
three quarters and a 10% increase in its leverage (financial risk)  reduced it by one third. 
Interestingly, product market dominance paid dividends in terms of promotion to the main 
board: a 10% increase in product market power led to a 25% increase in the firm’s hazard 
ratio. Finally, and surprisingly, net profit, was found to be economically relatively 
unimportant, with a 10% increase leading to only about one half of one percent increase in 
its chances of immediate promotion. In such booming times (the Hang Seng increased on 
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average 16% each year) current profit seems, therefore, to have been sacrificed to current 
growth potential of the company in the promotion stakes. 
In conclusion, a listing on the GEM in this period was, for a significant minority of 
companies a ‘stairway to heaven’ and only for a very small and disparate minority a 
‘gateway to hell’. Common factors behind a company’s path to the heavenly gates or 
descent into the inferno of bankruptcy were readily identified, with the level of the market 
and VC backing to the company central to a heavenly ascent. 
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Appendix 1: Summary of the main findings of the literature 
Authors Year of 
Publication 
Study characteristics Analysis method Influences 
  Country & market Period,  sample 
size 
Panel? Hazard rate? Survival  Promotion 
Hensler et al 1997 US, Nasdaq 1975-1984, 
N= 741 
Yes Yes, AFT Age(+), size(+), 
day1retn(+), insider 
ownership(+) 
NA 
Jain and Kini 1999 US, SDC 1977-1990, 
N= 877 
Yes Multinomial Logit VC backing(+), pre-
IPO operating 
performance(+), 
insider ownership(+), 
prestigious 
investment 
bankers(+), strategic 
R&D(+) 
NA 
Bhaba and Petty 2003 US 1987-1991 No Cross section Prospectus info. NA 
Fama and French 2004 US, Nasdaq? 1973-2001, 
N=705 
No Cross section Profitability(+), 
growth rate(+) 
NA 
Cumming 2006 Canada Venture capital 
funds, N=214 
No Cross section  NA NA 
Demers and Joos 2006 US, SDC 1980-2000, 
N=1516 
Yes 
 
 
Logit Characteristics of 
intermediaries, 
accounting info, 
technological type 
NA 
Cumming 2006       
Kooli and 
Meknassi 
2007 US, SDC 1985-2005, 
N=7957 
Yes  Yes, AFT VC backing(+),degree 
of underpricing(+), 
Ipo 
size(+),underwriter 
reputation(+) 
NA 
Jain and Kini 2008 US 1980-1997, 
N=6922 
Yes Yes, CPH Strategic 
investment(+), post-
IPO operating 
performance(+), 
NA 
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diversification(+), 
capex(+) 
Van der Goot et al 2009 US, Nasdaq 1996-2001, 
N=326 
Yes Yes, CPH Credit risk(-), 
competition risk(-) 
Industry risk(-) 
NA 
Cumming and 
Johan 
2010 Canada, US 
VC investments 
exiting via IPO, 
Private methods 
and Writeoffs 
1991-2004 
N=557, Canada  
N=1607, US 
Yes Yes, CPH Duration influenced 
by stage(-) and size(-) 
of investment, stock 
market returns(-), 
country factors 
NA 
Johan 2010 Canada, Toronto 
Stock Exchanges, 
Junior and Senior 
markets. 
1997-2005 
N=196 and 215 
IPOs 
Yes Yes, CPH TSX (main market) 
companies are better 
prepared & so take 
less time to go to 
IPO, starting from 
the date of the 
preliminary 
prospectus, than 
TSX-V (high tech) 
companies. 
NA 
Carpentier and 
Suret 
2011 Canada, Toronto 
stock exchange 
1986-2003, 
N=2,373 
Yes Yes, CPH Revenues@IPO(+), 
profitability(+), 
auditor and 
investment banker 
reputation(+), VC 
backing(+) 
Yes 
Cumming and Dai 2011 US, NA 1991-2006 
N=9,266 VC 
investment rounds 
No No, Logit Firm maturity (later 
stage of investment) 
and VC prestige 
increase chance of 
successful exit 
(IPO/acquisition). 
NA 
Espenlaub et al 2012 UK, AIM 1995-2004, N=896 Yes  Yes, AFT Advisors 
(NOMADS)(+), 
age@IPO(+), 
size@IPO(+), insider 
NA 
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ownership(+)@IPO, 
VC backing(-) 
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Appendix 2:  Marginal impacts 
To examine the economic effects of the variables on the hazard of promotion, note that the hazard 
rate for the CPH model can be written 
ℎ|%, %, … , %4) = ℎ )exp	&% + &% +⋯+ &% +⋯ . .+&4%4) 
If % is a dummy variable and we change % = 0 to % = 1  then the hazard changes to   
ℎ89%, %, … , % + 1,… . %4) = ℎ )exp	&% + &% +⋯&[% + 1: +⋯+ &4%4) 
and the ratio of the hazards is now 
exp	&) 
For example, if we have , % = ;< then the ratio of the hazards is  
exp	&=>) = exp1.823658) = 6.1945 
which implies that the chances of a VC backed company being promoted in the next year are six 
times that of a non-VC backed company. 
For continuous variable % an increment of 1 may not make much sense. For example, the Herfindahl 
index herf has a value between 0 and 1, a mean of about 25% and a median of about 13%. The 
coefficient of herf however, is 9.207. If we exponentiate this we get (!) 
exp	&FGHI) = exp9.207) = 9966.65 
This does not even make sense since we cannot increase the H index by 1 (unless it is zero) in any 
case. So if we consider increasing the index proportionately by say 10% we’d find that the ratio of 
the hazards would now be 
exp	&FGHI.1)%) = exp	{9.207).1)%} 
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which clearly is a function of %. So to make this meaningful we might evaluate the function at the 
mean or median value. This gives  
exp{9.207). 1). 25)} = 1.26   or     exp{9.207). 1). 13)} = 1.13 
which implies that a 10% proportional increase in the H index results in a 26% increase in the hazard 
of promotion at the mean, and a 13% increase at the median. A lot more plausible! Adopting this 
approach for the two types of variables we find (ignoring quadratic terms) the following effects on 
the hazard ratios (Table A1): 
Table A1: Marginal effects on the hazard ratios of regressors in model 1 
Variable   Statistic Coefficient  Marginal 
effect on 
hazard 
ratio 
% 
increase/ 
decrease 
in hazard 
ratio 
 
Rank 
      |Median| |Mean| 
Np mean .4620 .1249 1.006 .6  7 
 median .0258 1.0003 .03 7  
goprev  mean 1.203 2.515 1.353 35  4 
 median .1626 1.042 4.2 6  
Debtrat mean 2.537 -1.491 .685 -31.5  5 
 median .4925 .929 -7.1 5  
VC 0 NA 1.824  
6.197 
   
 1 NA 519.7 2 2 
Herf mean .248 9.207 1.0463 25.7  6 
 median .131 1.0243 12.9 4  
Aud5 0 NA -1.472  
.229 
   
 1 NA -77.1 3 3 
HS mean 15628.7 .00246 46.74 4574  1 
 median 14402 34.57 3357 1  
Table calculates the marginal effect of variation in each variable on the hazard ratio.  For binary variables we calculate 
the effect of a change from 0 to 1; for continuous variables we calculate the effect of a 10% increase at the median or 
mean of the distribution. The last column shows the rank of the variables’ impact using absolute values. 
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i
 See Carpentier and Suret(2011) for an exception. 
ii
 For European data on the relative contribution of small and large firms, see the various reports of the 
European Observatory for SMEs(see EIASM, 1996), and for the US, reports of the Small Business 
Administration (SBA, 2012). 
iii
  Needless to say, a company that is bankrupt in the current year cannot transfer to the Main board in the 
coming year.  
iv
 Cumming and MacIntosh(2003) (CM)investigate the determinants of full and partial exits by VCs from their 
investee companies across the US and Canada. CM argue that a VC will exit from an investment at the time 
when the expected present discounted value of marginal return to effort of the VC in the business is less than 
the corresponding cost of effort. This may imply for some VCs and companies the relinquishing of only part of 
their holdings because future benefits may be larger if some foothold in the company is maintained (VC 
holdings as a real option).  
v
 These results were most marked for American rather than Canadian VCs, where significant effects were less 
in evidence. 
 
vi
 The typical fund life is 10-12 years and therefore as investments tend to be made by year three many 
investments will be liquidated before year 10. See Cumming and Macintosh (2003). 
vii
 A referee has pointed out that Cumming(2006) controlled for the number of managers working at the VC 
fund in order to address the problem of ‘limited attention’ which may affect VC performance. However, whilst 
this variable would be desirable, we do not have such information in the present database. 
viii
 The reader will recognise that we are identifying an interaction effect here. 
ix
 GEM firms whose market values are highly correlated with the market index will also find that a higher HS 
will raise their chances of promotion. In the regressions that follow, due to this co-linearity, we do not use 
market cap as a regressor in addition to HS. 
x
 The actual number of companies used in the hazard rate analysis is somewhat smaller than this due to (a) 
missing observations (e.g. missing accounts data); (b) some companies only offering 1 year of data (such 
companies cannot form part of a hazard rate analysis which requires at least two years of data on a company.) 
xi
Of  the 28 delistings that occurred 3 of these had only one year of data and so could not be used for our 
hazard rate analysis that follows. 
xii
 In the analysis that follows we use net profit (Np) as our profitability measure. This is partly because the 
quality requirements of the Main Board (MB) of the HK stock exchange mean that more profitable firms in that 
sense are more likely to  be promoted to the MB in the following year.   
xiii
 The figure of 2.25 for the mean leverage implies that book values of equity were negative on average. 
xiv
 To see this note that if all firms are of equal size H=1/N, where N is the number of firms. If we set this equal 
to .25 we get N=4. 
xv
 This may not be ideal as it does not measure the duration of VC involvement with the company, which as we 
have seen, was found to be significant in recent studies in predicting exits. (Cumming and Johan, 2010). 
However, we do not have any measure of Vc investment duration in our dataset.   
xvi
 It is easy to show that the predictor %&  does not include an intercept and that is why none is reported in 
the semiparametric analysis to follow. 
xvii
 Analysis time is measured in years from the origin runs from 1 to only 11, rather than 1 to 13 because, due 
to missing data and to the fact that a hazard rate requires two years of data to calculate, there are no 
observations with t=12 or 13. 
xviii
 ‘Net lost’ plus transfers in each period reduce the set of firms at risk in the next period, the so-called ‘risk 
set’. Thus, for example, in year 3, 1 firm transferred and 3 were censored so that the risk set in the next period 
is 118, having fallen by 1+3=4 over the previous year’s total of 122. 
xix
 But not significantly so. 
xx
 The mean comparison for sales growth is not significant at the 10% level. 
xxi
 Again, not significantly so. 
xxii
  Many other models were in fact estimated including the Gamma, Lognormal, AFT and cloglog models. 
However, several of the models failed to converge and the four models presented represent the most 
plausible results.  
xxiii
 There are no outcomes where delistwhy = 6. 
xxiv
 The RElogit program in STATA used in this analysis does not produce Chi2 values or Pseudo R2. 
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xxv
 Due to issues of non-convergence and/or co-linearity in the estimation we were unable to include time 
dummies along with industry controls in any of  the regressions. However, the concentration index (H) and 
market index (HS) control to some degree for industry and calendar effects. 
xxvi
 This may of course also be explained by the very small sample size for bankrupt companies. 
xxvii
 This method uses the proportion of 1’s in the population as a parameter. Since we do not have the 
proportions for the whole period we used the proportions for the period 2007-2011 from Table 1 for this 
purpose. We note that this is not, however, ideal. The analysis underlying this program is in King and 
Zeng(1999a,b). The STATA software is to be found in Tomz,King and Zeng(1999) and can be downloaded from 
http://gking.harvard.edu. 
xxviii
 We thank a perceptive referee for pointing out the importance of examining the economic impact of the 
variables on the promotion hazard. 
xxix
 See Appendix 2 for details of the calculations of the marginal impacts on the hazard ratios of variations in 
the independent variables. 
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